Psychotherapist’s epistemic responsibility

Abstract

Recent debates in the philosophy of psychiatry show that the concept of a mental dis­order concept is socially determined, encouraging further engagement in a continu­ous dialogue about various possible interpretations of mental disorders and a redefini­tion of psychiatry as a discursive activity susceptible to the influence of the culture and the society in which it is practiced. This also applies to psychotherapy as a discursive activity and justifies the ongoing development of hermeneutic approaches to psycho­therapy. These are founded on the view that a mental disorder is constructed within the communicational act between a clinician and their patient.

Given that the epistemic asymmetry inherent in the relationship of a therapist and their client favours the therapist, as shown by numerous examples, the psychotherapist is obliged to approach the client in an epistemically responsible and empirically adequate manner. This requires sensitivity to the evidence, understood as healthy scepticism to­wards the scientific foundations of the concept of mental disorders and psychotherapeu­tic theories, as well as critical reflexion upon their own theoretical presuppositions and prejudices.