On the weaknesses and limitations of categorical psychiatric classifications of mental disorders: commentary on a philosophical discussion by Rachel Cooper (2005)

Abstract

The paper presents a pragmatic commentary on the philosophical study of the classification of mental disorders as natural kinds. Natural kinds are entities with constituent properties based on which they can be categorized, like chemical elements in the periodic table. In the paper, I’m testing the potential biological determinants of such a classification of mental disorders, i.e., DNA or genes and organic dysfunctions. Through the discussion, I find that the naturalistic aspect of dysfunctionality is not consistent with the subjective aspect of dysfunctionality, based on which mental disorders are defined. Biological (dys)functionality refers to the (in)ability of genes to survive, in the context of which well-being and ill-feeling represent a means of directing behavior and not desirable or undesirable outcome. With the mismatch between the biological perspective and the theory of mental health, I justify my opinion that mental disorders cannot be classified as natural types.